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NOTE
JURY COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING-
THE PER DIEM ARGUMENT
In an action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while attempting
to board defendant's bus, plaintiff's counsel formulated the damages for
pain and suffering on a per diem basis. He estimated the value of plaintiff's
pain and suffering for the twenty-two months between the accident and trial
at 100 dollars per day and placed that figure and total, 66,000 dollars, on
a blackboard. Counsel then estimated future pain and suffering at 2,000
dollars per year for thirty-four years, plaintiff's life expectancy, which re-
sulted in a total figure claimed as damages for pain and suffering of 134,000
dollars. Special damages, past and future, were totaled at 53,903 dollars,
seventy-five cents. The jury returned a verdict for 187,903 dollars, seventy-
five cents, exactly the amount plaintiff claimed, and judgment was entered
thereon. The appellate court reversed, one of the grounds being that the
damages were excessive.' The California Supreme Court in a four to three
decision affirmed the judgment of the trial court, thereby approving the
largest award for pain and suffering heretofore sustained in California.2
After noting that the propriety of the "per diem argument" has not been
considered in California, the court held that defendant waived any mis-
conduct in such an argument by failing to object at trial and by using a
similar argument of his own. 3 Traynor, J., in dissent, condemned the "per
diem argument" as an artifice of sophistry.
There is a sharp divergence of opinion in the twenty jurisdictions which
have considered the "per diem argument.", Seven jurisdictions have ap-
proved its use,' four have allowed it "for illustration only,"' and nine juris-
1 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 186 Cal. App. 2d -- , 9 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1960).
2 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d -- , 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d
337 (1961).
3 Id. at -- , 15 Cal. Rptr. at 168, 364 P.2d at 344.
4 15 AM. Jun. Damages § 72 (1961 Supp.); 60 A.L.R. 1347 (1958).
'Penn. R.R. v. McKinly, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1961) (leaves the argument to the
discretion of the trial court); Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956)
(Dist. Ct. sitting without a jury); McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. 2d 315
(1958); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959); Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry.,
31 Ill. App. 2d 198, 175 N.E.2d 564 (1961); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mattingly, 339
S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1954); Four-
County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Texas & N.O.
R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
6 Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956); John-
son v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co.,
11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960) (trial court should instruct that the argument is
lawyer's talk and not evidence); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960)
(trial court should admonish that counsel's argument is not evidence).
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dictions have condemned it absolutely.7 A few of the reasons given for not
allowing the "per diem argument" extend beyond the propriety of the per
diem method itself and are concerned with the propriety of any mention
of a monetary amount to the jury." The opponents of the method argue
that there is not, and cannot be, an evidentiary basis for the correlation be-
tween pain and suffering and money;9 that such suggestions by counsel
amount to testimony on matters not disclosed by the evidence;0 and that
the "per diem argument" is misleading because the jury will consider the
amount suggested as evidence and thereby render an excessive verdict."
If a court were to adopt this line of reasoning, it would seem inescapable
that it could not consistently allow comment in terms of the total figure,
2
and yet forbid comment in terms of the per diem figure. 3 However, the
fact that the only measure of damages for pain and suffering-reasonable-
ness' 4-is imprecise, is not a good reason sui generis for excluding a state-
ment of the amount claimed."5 Thus, the proponents respond with the
contention that the evidence must provide a foundation for the per diem
suggestion, because the jury's award must be justified by the evidence of
pain and suffering.16 Further, they insist the "per diem argument" is not
misleading but helpful because it provides practical guidance;1 that the
exaggerated danger of a jury's mistaking the per diem suggestion for evi-
dence can be dispelled by appropriate instructions from the trial court,'8
and the very absence of a precise measure justifies guidance of the jury.19
7 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Chandler, 283 F. 881 (8th Cir. 1922); Vaughan v. Magee,
218 Fed. 630 (3d Cir. 1914); Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958)
(Dist. Ct. sitting without a jury); Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.2d 394 (1958);
Faught v. Washam, 365 Mo. 1021, 329 S.W.2d 588 (1959); Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ.
82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958); Stassum v. Chapin, 234 Pa. 125, 188 Ati. 111 (1936) (Penn-
sylvania has long condemned any reference to the ad damnum clause); Certified T.V.
Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959); Affett v. Milwaukee
& Surb. Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
8 The reasons pro and con are listed in Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla.
1959).
9 Affett v. Milwaukee & Surb. Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274
(1960).
1OFaught v. Washam, 365 Mo. 1021, 329 S.W.2d 588 (1959).
"I Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955).
12 The "total figure" adverted to in this note refers exclusively to the amount of
damages claimed for past and future pain and suffering, and, to counsel's statement of
that amount in toto to the jury.
'3 See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1955) (In addition to condemn-
ing the "per diem argument" as an "unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the jury,"
the court overruled prior decisions allowing the jury to be advised of the total figure
claimed for pain and suffering.).
1
4 McComcK, DAMAGEs § 88 (1935).
1553 Am. Jun. Trial § 485 (1945).
16 Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d .144 (1954).
17 Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956).
18 Cases cited note 5 supra. "[The] argument is not evidence, and we cannot
attribute to any jury in this state a lack of sufficient mentality to distinguish between the
two." Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wash. 2d 23, 31, 351 P.2d 153, 159 (1960).
19 Ratner v. Axrington, 111 So. 2d 82, 89 (Fla. 1959).
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If comment on the damages claimed is allowed in the form of a total
figure, there may be no good reason for distinguishing on the ground of
legal propriety, the per diem statement of the amount claimed as damages.
However, in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines20 such a distinction is at-
tempted in the dissenting opinion in the form of an attack on the "per diem
argument" itself. It is argued that if one took the second as the unit and
awarded one cent per second, the result would be 31,536 dollars per year.
"The absurdity of such a result must be apparent, yet a penny a second
for pain and suffering might not sound unreasonable.""1 The apparent ab-
surdity is possibly the result of confusing the "per diem suggestion" as a
substitute for the standard of reasonableness. The per diem method is a
suggestion about a manner of stating the amount to be judged by the crite-
rion of reasonableness,"2 and that criterion involves consideration of the
nature and extent of the injury by the jury.23 The point remains whether
or not a particular sum of money is justified by the evidence.
Another argument presented in the Seffert dissent is that any error in
the per diem amount will be compounded in the total amount. As a prac-
tical matter, such error can occur only if both figures appear to be reason-
able and are in fact unreasonable. The jury must consider both statements
of the amount to be awarded, and thus the legitimate point of this argument
is that the jury will have equal difficulty in determining the reasonable
amount, whether it be considered in per diem or in total figures. It would
be a questionable psychological assumption that the jury would make fewer
mistakes in the one consideration than in the other; a decision ought not
turn on such tenuous ground.
A further argument against the per diem method is that it overlooks the
fact that pain and suffering vary from day to day24-which is itself a per
diem consideration of pain and suffering. However, the per diem figure
does not represent one isolated day; the very expression of the per diem
figure is in terms of all the days, months, or years remaining in plaintiff's
life. Considerations such as that pain and suffering will vary, are assumed
in the standard of reasonableness. Thus, such considerations are equally
applicable regardless of the particular mathematical expression of the
amount claimed, because the criterion of reasonableness is applicable to
both the per diem figure and the total figure.
It is incongruous to allow juries to award compensation in money and
to forbid evaluations in money. The broad criterion of reasonableness is of
such great dimension, encompassing such broad considerations, that the
application of rigid rules of exclusion to these considerations seems inap-
propriate. Furthermore, a distinction between the propriety of allowing
20 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d -, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d
337 (1961).
21 Id. at -, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 171, 364 P.2d at 347 (dissent) (quoting from Affett
v. Milwaukee & Surb. Transp. Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960)).
22 Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1954).
23 Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal. 2d 820, 822, 172 P.2d 353, 354 (1946); 15 Am. Jun.
Damages § 72 (1945).
24 Hallada v. Great No. Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1955) (However, Min-
nesota approved the "per diem argument," in Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248
Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956)).
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comment in the form of a total figure and a corresponding per diem figure
is rather subtle, where a high degree of exactitude, is in either event im-
possible. The apparent impossiblity of supporting these refined distinctions
on an emperical or analytical basis may indicate that the best assurance
of obtaining reasonable results in the monetary evaluation of pain and
suffering is to sanction the "per diem argument," and rely upon the restraint
and common sense of the jury.
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